Rwanda’s Expansionist Doctrine in the DRC: An Industry of Misleading Narratives

Fernandez MURHOLA examines historical and security narratives used to explain intervention in eastern DRC. He compares them with UN findings, international law and the rights of all affected communities, and calls for evidence-based accountability.

From the misuse of history to breaches of international law: how an aggression can be concealed behind words.

Geopolitical commentary by Fernandez MURHOLA
International human rights defender, National Human Rights Commissioner of the DRC from 2015 to 2022, and graduate of the second special session on defence and resilience strategies at the DRC's senior military academy.

Kinshasa, 22 September 2026

Introduction: behind the rebellions, a battle over the narrative

The conflict that has devastated eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for three decades cannot be reduced to a succession of local rebellions, communal disputes or spontaneous security crises. It is also a contest over narratives used to justify, minimize or normalize foreign intervention on Congolese soil.

Since 1996, a similar pattern has returned under different names: AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23 and then AFC/M23. Organizations, leaders, circumstances and justifications have changed. One theme persists: Rwanda's security is repeatedly cited to explain operations on the DRC's sovereign territory.

International law sets a limit. A state's security concerns do not, by themselves, give it an enduring right to intervene militarily in a neighbouring country. Kigali's account must therefore be tested against established facts, international documents, applicable law and possible responsibility.

This article does not claim that every official Rwandan statement is false by nature. Its argument is narrower: when independent international findings contradict an official account, that account requires factual and legal scrutiny, not merely political debate.

1. History used as an instrument: the myth of “natural borders”

Historical presence, citizenship and sovereignty

The claim that a substantial part of eastern DRC is “historically Rwandan land” needs careful examination. It often conflates three different things: the long-standing presence of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in areas now within the DRC, migration before and during colonial rule, and the DRC's territorial sovereignty.

A community's historical presence does not automatically confer sovereign title on another state. Contemporary international law does not allow a country to claim its neighbour's territory merely because some residents have historical, family, linguistic or cultural ties across the border.

What the Berlin Conference did not decide on its own

The 1885 General Act of Berlin did not, by itself, draw the DRC's present borders. Those emerged from treaties, colonial arrangements, administrative delimitations and state succession. After independence, the governing principle became the stability of borders inherited from decolonization.

Members of the Organization of African Unity reaffirmed that principle in Cairo in 1964. Article 4 of the African Union's Constitutive Act also recognizes it. The purpose is to protect the continent against unilateral border changes by force. The presence of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in Congo therefore does not turn Congolese land into Rwandan territory.

Kivu's political societies, including Bushi, Buhavu, Bahunde and Nande areas, had their own institutions before and during colonial consolidation. The region's history is not simply an extension of Rwanda's.

The Banyarwanda Immigration Mission

Migration from Rwanda requires the same precision. From 1937, the Belgian colonial administration organized transfers and settlements in parts of Kivu, notably Masisi, through the Banyarwanda Immigration Mission. Colonial labour needs and demographic pressure in Rwanda were among the drivers.

Some historical studies estimate migration from Rwanda to Kivu during colonial rule at around 200,000 people. This is an estimate, not a final census. The mission neither disproves the older roots of some Kinyarwanda-speaking Kivu communities nor calls into question the Congolese citizenship of people legally entitled to it. It does show that demographic presence, even long-standing presence, is not proof of prior Rwandan sovereignty. Population, citizenship and sovereign title are different questions.

2. International law tested against the facts

How aggression is assessed

UN General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) provides a reference definition of aggression. Article 3 includes invasion or attack by one state's armed forces on another's territory, as well as certain forms of sending or supporting armed groups.

A vital qualification remains: the existence of M23 alone does not legally establish the crime of aggression. The facts, state involvement, nature of support or control and applicable rules must be determined. Successive reports of the UN Group of Experts matter precisely because they examine these issues.

What UN reports document

Report S/2012/348/Add.1 presented substantial evidence concerning support from Rwandan officials to armed groups in eastern DRC and M23's creation. A decade later, report S/2022/967 described direct operations by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) on Congolese territory, supplies of weapons, ammunition and uniforms to M23/AFC, and operations against the Congolese armed forces (FARDC).

Report S/2025/446 goes further. It describes active RDF participation in fighting and clearing operations, support for AFC/M23 leadership, and joint capture of strategic, mineral-rich areas. It also documents parallel administrations designed to consolidate territorial control and generate revenue.

The legal issue does not depend on Kigali's political label for M23. It concerns the nature of its support, the degree of control, the attribution of acts and any resulting violations of international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence. The African Union's Constitutive Act also protects inherited borders. National security is not an indefinite licence for operations abroad.

3. Resources in an economy of predation

Minerals are among the conflict's most sensitive questions. Credibility requires avoiding dramatic figures that do not rest on comparable data. A more useful question is how minerals extracted in areas held by armed groups can enter international supply chains under a designation that hides their actual origin.

The issue is not only the volume of Rwandan exports. It is traceability, provenance, certification and the responsibility of each actor. Who controls the mines? Who collects revenue, transports the minerals, certifies their origin and receives the economic benefit?

Where resources are extracted in a conflict zone and their trade finances an armed organization, international humanitarian law, sanctions systems and corporate due diligence all become relevant. Terms such as conflict minerals, origin laundering or financing of armed groups should be used where evidence supports them. It would, however, be irresponsible to accuse a specific company of a criminal offence without establishing its elements.

The strength of a Congolese case will come from reconstructing and proving the value chain, not from exaggeration.

4. Three narratives that demand a rigorous response

The FDLR security narrative

The FDLR's presence in eastern DRC is a documented security concern. The armed group must be confronted in accordance with law. Its presence does not give Rwanda an unlimited right to intervene in the DRC.

Depending on the facts and applicable rules, a cross-border threat may raise a question of self-defence. That right is neither automatic nor boundless. Necessity and proportionality matter. It cannot provide a standing justification for occupying or administering another state's territory.

The narrative of genocide against Congolese Tutsi

It would be irresponsible to say that no inquiry has documented crimes against Tutsi in the DRC. Congolese Tutsi have suffered serious violence. Every victim, whatever their identity, is entitled to the law's protection.

Persecution, massacres, crimes against humanity and genocide must nevertheless be distinguished. Genocide requires a specific intent supported by evidence. At the same time, crimes against Hutu refugees in Congo cannot be minimized.

The UN Human Rights Office's Mapping Report recorded 617 serious incidents between 1993 and 2003. It noted that some attacks could be characterized as genocide if a competent court established the required intent. The responsible answer is not to set one community's memory against another's, but to demand impartial justice for all victims.

The “failed state” narrative

“Failed state” is not a legal category that suspends sovereignty. A state may be fragile or unable to exercise some functions in part of its territory and still remain sovereign.

Institutional weakness does not make the DRC's territory ownerless or give a neighbour a right of guardianship. The DRC must restore state authority; its partners should help it do so; neighbouring states must respect its sovereignty.

5. Fourteen narratives to test against the evidence, 1996–2026

1. “Dismantling the camps”: AFDL, 1996–1997

Disarming armed groups and protecting borders were real concerns. They could not justify unlimited foreign intervention or crimes against civilians and refugees. Where evidence permits, those crimes must be documented and prosecuted.

2. “The RCD is Congolese”: 1998–2002

A conflict is hard to describe as purely internal when foreign states provide decisive military support. Command structures, logistics and resource exploitation all require examination.

3. “Greater Rwanda's natural borders”: 1998–2026

Ethnic, linguistic and historical affinities do not amount to a modern sovereign title. Respect for borders inherited from independence prevents population movements from being converted into territorial claims.

4. “The FDLR threaten us”: 2004–2026

The FDLR must be confronted. That does not create a right of conquest. Any foreign operation must comply with the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and human rights law.

5. “The CNDP protects Tutsi”: 2006–2013

Civilian protection cannot shield the creation or support of a military organization. Crimes in Kiwanja and elsewhere must be attributed individually. Protecting a community does not place an armed movement beyond the law.

6. “M23 is a Congolese mutiny”: 2012–2013

Report S/2012/348/Add.1 documents support originating from Rwanda and the involvement of RDF officials in M23's creation and support. A simple account of an internal mutiny does not explain the whole phenomenon.

7. “The DRC is a failed state”: 2015–2026

A state in difficulty retains its sovereignty. Its weaknesses cannot become a warrant for foreign control.

8. “Our minerals are Rwandan”: 2018–2026

The question is not the identity of mine workers. It is the territorial origin, control, transport and certification of resources. When a Congolese mining area is controlled by a foreign force or a group it supports, traceability becomes an international concern.

9. “There is a genocide against Tutsi in Kinshasa”: 2020–2026

Any accusation of genocide requires evidence. Political use of the term is dangerous regardless of who employs it. The memory of victims must not become a justification for military policy.

10. “Rwanda is a stabilizing power”: 2021–2026

Rwanda's participation in operations in Mozambique or the Central African Republic does not, by itself, prove predation. Each mission must be assessed by its mandate, legal basis and possible interests. Equally, an image of stability must not preclude independent examination of Rwanda's conduct in the DRC.

11. “M23 is a disciplined liberation movement”: 2022–2026

Report S/2022/967 documents RDF involvement alongside M23. Alleged massacres in Kishishe and other localities require independent investigation and individual attribution of responsibility. Apparent discipline does not turn an armed group into a legitimate authority.

12. “The Wazalendo are new Interahamwe”: 2023–2026

Armed groups allied with the FARDC are not exempt from accountability. Their abuses must also be investigated. Yet equating every local resistance group with the former genocidal forces is an overgeneralization that the facts do not support.

13. “Balkanization is a fantasy”: 2024–2026

Whether a parallel administration exists should be assessed through territorial control, taxation, courts, security, resource management and appointments. Report S/2025/446 describes AFC/M23 administrative structures in conquered areas. Questions of occupation, de facto administration and international responsibility cannot be dismissed by a denial.

14. “Congo is too large”: 2025–2026

Any statement of this kind must be placed in its exact context before it is treated as evidence of a partition plan. One rule remains: no negotiation can produce the forcible loss of Congolese sovereignty over part of its territory. Decentralization, political dialogue and constitutional reform do not license borders to be changed by force.

6. Thirty years of diplomatic language alongside the facts

From 1994 to 2026, Rwandan diplomacy passed through six successive periods associated with Anastase Gasana, Augustin Iyamuremye, Charles Murigande, Louise Mushikiwabo, Richard Sezibera, Vincent Biruta and Olivier Nduhungirehe. Holding an office does not, by itself, make a minister responsible for every state decision. Political or legal responsibility must be established through acts, decisions, statements and documents.

The sound method is to compare official statements, verified facts and international reports period by period, noting any contradictions. Diplomacy cannot replace investigation. Nor should a call for dialogue reduce an internationalized war to a purely “inter-Congolese conflict” when credible sources document a neighbouring state's military involvement.

Dialogue is necessary for peace. It must not erase international responsibility.

Conclusion: establish the truth to make peace possible

Three decades of war in eastern DRC require moving beyond single explanations: “ethnic conflict”, “refugee problem”, “FDLR”, “Congolese M23”, “failed state” or “communal conflict”. Each may contain an element of reality. None alone justifies another state's military intervention on Congolese soil.

History must be documented, facts established, responsibilities individualized and law applied. The presence of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in eastern Congo reflects a complex history of older migration, colonial policy, forced displacement and regional crises. It does not give Rwanda territorial title.

The International Court of Justice provides a useful precedent in DRC v. Uganda. In its judgment of 19 December 2005, it found that Uganda had violated the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention, as well as other international obligations. In 2022, it awarded the DRC US$325 million for damage to persons, property and natural resources.

The Court did not decide a claim against Rwanda on its merits. In DRC v. Rwanda, it held in 2006 that it lacked jurisdiction over the case as brought. Any new case therefore needs a firm jurisdictional basis, contemporary evidence and careful legal characterization.

Report S/2025/446 provides important evidence: active RDF participation in AFC/M23 operations, control of areas of North and South Kivu, access to mineral-rich zones and the establishment of parallel administrations.

This is not an argument against the Rwandan people, Tutsi or Hutu. It concerns international law, sovereignty, civilian protection and accountability.

What should be done?

1. Build a documented legal strategy

Document foreign military involvement and preserve evidence.
Reconstruct command structures and financial or mineral flows.
Identify individuals who may incur criminal responsibility.
Examine proceedings before the International Court of Justice where jurisdiction exists.
Use international criminal justice mechanisms where jurisdiction and admissibility conditions are met.

2. Strengthen economic traceability

Minerals from conflict areas need tighter controls. Businesses cannot plead ignorance when serious risks of financing armed actors have been documented. Investigations must target proven economic chains, not pick a company without evidence of complicity.

3. Restore state authority

Protect civilians and secure borders.
Professionalize the FARDC and address proven infiltration.
Disarm armed groups and protect strategic mining sites.
Re-establish legitimate civilian administration in liberated areas.

4. Build a fact-based national memory

The DRC should teach the documented history of the conflicts, preserve archives, digitize testimony, support academic research, establish memorials and include transitional justice in reconstruction. The 2010 Mapping Report should remain a reference, never a pretext for criminalizing a community.

Rwanda has a right to protect its security; so does the DRC. Kinyarwanda-speaking people have a right to security and citizenship, as do other Congolese communities. All victims, whether Hutu, Tutsi or members of other communities, deserve justice.

No community should become a permanent pretext for violating a state's sovereignty. No state can turn military power into territorial ownership.

Lasting peace in the Great Lakes region requires four pillars:

truth;
justice;
reparation;
guarantees of non-repetition.

Congo is not asking to stand above the law. It asks that the law apply to all. If evidence establishes Rwanda's international responsibility, competent mechanisms should examine it. Congolese armed groups must answer for their crimes; political leaders for their decisions; businesses for their due-diligence duties. Victims must receive truth, justice and reparation.

Dialogue remains possible, peace necessary and reconciliation desirable. But peace without truth is only a truce. Peace without justice rewards impunity. Peace without sovereignty resembles capitulation. Peace without safeguards against recurrence prepares another war.

Congo does not need another narrative. It needs evidence, law and a state able to uphold both.

Documentary references

This article presents the author's analysis. The references help distinguish documented findings, legal interpretations and editorial judgments.